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Abstract This paper argues that the IPCC has oversimplified the issue of uncertainty in its
Assessment Reports, which can lead to misleading overconfidence. A concerted effort by
the IPCC is needed to identify better ways of framing the climate change problem, explore
and characterize uncertainty, reason about uncertainty in the context of evidence-based
logical hierarchies, and eliminate bias from the consensus building process itself.
1 Introduction
The challenge of framing and communicating uncertainty about climate change is a symptom of
the broader challenge of understanding and reasoning about the complex climate system.
Complexity of the climate system arises from the very large number of degrees of freedom, the
number of subsystems and complexity in linking them, and the nonlinear and chaotic nature of
the atmosphere and ocean. Our understanding of the complex climate system is hampered by
myriad uncertainties, ignorance, and cognitive biases. The epistemology of computer
simulations of complex systems is a new and active area of research among scientists,
philosophers, and the artificial intelligence community. How to reason about uncertainties in the
complex climate system and its computer simulations is not simple or obvious.
How has the IPCC1 dealt with the challenge of uncertainty of the complex climate system?
Prior to the Moss and Schneider (2000) Guidance paper, uncertainty was dealt with by the
IPCC in an ad hoc manner. The Moss-Schneider guidelines raised a number of important
issues regarding the identification and communication of uncertainties. However, the actual
implementation of this guidance adopted a subjective perspective or “judgmental estimates of
confidence.” Defenders of the IPCC uncertainty characterization argue that subjective
consensus expressed using simple terms is more easily understood by policy makers.
The consensus approach used by the IPCC to characterize uncertainty has received a number
of criticisms. Van der Sluijs et al. (2010a) find that the IPCC consensus strategy underexposes
scientific uncertainties and dissent, making the chosen policy vulnerable to scientific error and
limiting the political playing field. Van der Sluijs (2010b) argues that matters on which no
consensus can be reached continue to receive too little attention by the IPCC, even though
this dissension can be highly policy-relevant. Oppenheimer et al. (2007) point out the need to
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guard against overconfidence and argue that the IPCC consensus emphasizes expected
outcomes, whereas it is equally important that policy makers understand the more extreme
possibilities that consensus may exclude or downplay. Gruebler and Nakicenovic (2001)
opine that “there is a danger that the IPCC consensus position might lead to a dismissal of
uncertainty in favor of spuriously constructed expert opinion.”
The consensus approach being used by the IPCC has failed to produce a thorough portrayal
of the complexities of the problem and the associated uncertainties in our understanding. While
the public may not understand the complexity of the science or be culturally predisposed to
accept the consensus, they can certainly understand the vociferous arguments over the science
portrayed by the media. Better characterization of uncertainty and ignorance and a more
realistic portrayal of confidence levels could go a long way towards reducing the “noise” and
animosity portrayed in the media that fuels the public distrust of climate science and acts to
stymie the policy process. An improved characterization of uncertainty and ignorance would
promote better overall understanding of the science and how to best target resources to improve
understanding. Further, improved understanding and characterization of uncertainty is critical
information for the development of robust policy options.
2 Indeterminacy and framing of the climate change problem
An underappreciated aspect of uncertainty is associated with the questions that do not even get
asked. Wynne (1992) argues that scientific knowledge typically investigates “a restricted
agenda of defined uncertainties—ones that are tractable—leaving invisible a range of other
uncertainties, especially about the boundary conditions of applicability of the existing
framework of knowledge to new situations.” Wynne refers to this as indeterminacy, which
arises from the “unbounded complexity of causal chains and open networks.” Indeterminacies
can arise from not knowing whether the type of scientific knowledge and the questions posed
are appropriate and sufficient for the circumstances in which the knowledge is applied.
Such indeterminacy is inherent in how climate change is framed. De Boer et al. (2010)
state that: “Frames act as organizing principles that shape in a ‘hidden’ and taken-for-
granted way how people conceptualize an issue.” De Boer et al. further state that such
frames can direct how a problem is stated, who should make a statement about it, what
questions are relevant, and what answers might be appropriate.
The UNFCCC2 Treaty provides the rationale for framing the IPCC assessment of climate
change and its uncertainties, in terms of identifying dangerous climate change and providing
input for decision making regarding CO2 stabilization targets. In the context of this framing,
key scientific questions receive little attention. In detecting and attributing 20th century
climate change, the IPCC AR43 all but dismisses natural internal multidecadal variability in
the attribution argument. The IPCC AR4 conducted no systematic assessment of the impact of
uncertainty in 20th century solar variability on attribution, and indirect solar impacts on
climate are little known and remain unexplored in any meaningful way. The IPCC WG II
Report focuses on possible dangerous anthropogenic warming impacts, with little summary
mention of how warming might be beneficial to certain regions or sectors.
The framework associated with setting a CO2 stabilization target focuses research and
analysis on using expert judgment to identify a most likely value of sensitivity/ warming and
2 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, http://unfccc.int/2860.php
3 IPCC 4th Assessment Report, Chapter 9, http://www.ipcc.ch/publications_and_data/ar4/wg1/en/ch9s9-4-1-
5.html
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narrowing the range of expected values, rather than fully exploring the uncertainty and the
possibility for black swans (Taleb 2007) and dragon kings (Sornette 2009). The concept of
imaginable surprise was discussed in the Moss-Schneider uncertainty guidance documentation,
but consideration of such possibilities seems largely to have been ignored by the AR4 report. A
key issue is to identify potential black swans in natural climate variation under no human
influence, over time scales of one to two centuries (e.g. Ferrari 2009). States Ferrari: “Weather
has these Black Swans too. It follows that blindly assuming continued warming climate trends
will lead to the observation of slightly warmer temperatures year over year may work for a
while, until a cold snap like the one that hit the eastern US at the beginning of last winter
produces one of the coldest starts to winter in many years.” Sharp conflicts over both the
science and policy reflect this overly narrow framing of the climate change problem. Until the
climate change problem is reframed or the IPCC considers multiple frames, both scientific and
policy debates will continue to ignore crucial elements of climate, while formulating confidence
levels about anthopogenic climate change that are too high and potentially misleading.
3 Uncertainty, ignorance and confidence
The Uncertainty Guidance Paper by Moss and Schneider (2000) recommended a common
vocabulary to express quantitative levels of confidence based on the amount of evidence
(number of sources of information) and the degree of agreement (consensus) among
experts. This assessment strategy omits any systematic analysis of the types and levels
uncertainty and quality of the evidence, and more importantly dismisses indeterminacy and
ignorance as important factors in assessing these confidence levels. In context of the narrow
framing of the problem, this uncertainty assessment strategy can promote the consensus
into becoming a self-fulfilling prophecy. For example, the IPCC’s framing of the climate
change problem in the context of anthropogenic forcing has resulted in substantial
elaboration of this line of research, with the multi-decadal modes of natural internal climate
variability being all but dismissed as an important explanation of any aspect of the 20th
century global climate change attribution.
The uncertainty guidance provided for the IPCC AR4 distinguished between levels of
confidence in scientific understanding and the likelihoods of specific results. In practice,
primary conclusions in the AR4 included a mixture of likelihood and confidence statements
that are ambiguous. Curry andWebster (2011) have raised specific issues with regards to the
statement “Most of the observed increase in global average temperatures since the mid-20th
century is very likely due to the observed increase in anthropogenic greenhouse gas
concentrations,” that are related to apparent circular reasoning in the attribution argument
and ambiguity in the attribution statement itself. Risbey and Kandlikar (2007) describe
ambiguities in actually applying likelihood and confidence, e.g. situations where likelihood
and confidence cannot be fully separated and likelihood levels contain implicit confidence
levels.
Numerous methods of categorizing risk and uncertainty have been described in the
context of different disciplines and various applications (e.g. Bammer and Smithson 2008).
Of particular relevance for climate change are schemes for analyzing uncertainty when
conducting risk analyses. My primary concerns about the IPCC’s characterization of
uncertainty are twofold:
& lack of discrimination between statistical uncertainty and scenario uncertainty
& failure to meaningfully address the issue of ignorance
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Ignorance is that which is unknown. Walker et al. (2003) categorize the following
different levels of ignorance. Total ignorance implies a deep level of uncertainty, to the
extent that we do not even know that we do not know. Recognized ignorance refers to
fundamental uncertainty in the mechanisms being studied and a weak scientific basis for
developing scenarios. Reducible ignorance may be resolved by conducting further research,
whereas irreducible ignorance implies that research cannot improve knowledge (e.g. what
happened prior to the big bang). Bammer and Smithson (2008) further distinguish between
conscious ignorance (where we know we don’t know what we don’t know), versus
unacknowledged or meta-ignorance (where we don’t even consider the possibility of error).
The IPCC AR4 uncertainty guidance4 neglects to include ignorance in its characterization of
uncertainty, although inclusion of ignorance was explicitly recommended by Kandlikar et al.
(2005). Overconfidence is an inevitable result of neglecting ignorance.
Following Walker et al. (2003), statistical uncertainty is distinguished from scenario
uncertainty, whereby scenario uncertainty implies that it is not possible to formulate the
probability of occurrence particular outcomes. A scenario is a plausible but unverifiable
description of how the system and/or its driving forces may develop in the future. Scenarios
may be regarded as a range of discrete possibilities with no a priori allocation of likelihood.
Whereas the IPCC reserves the term “scenario” for emissions scenarios, Betz (2009) argues
for the logical necessity of considering each climate model simulation as a modal statement
of possibility, stating what is possibly true about the future climate system, which is
consistent with scenario uncertainty.
Stainforth et al. (2007) argue that model inadequacy and an insufficient number of
simulations in the ensemble preclude producing meaningful probability distributions from
the frequency of model outcomes of future climate. Stainforth et al. state: “Given nonlinear
models with large systematic errors under current conditions, no connection has been even
remotely established for relating the distribution of model states under altered conditions to
decision-relevant probability distributions. . . Furthermore, they are liable to be misleading
because the conclusions, usually in the form of PDFs,5 imply much greater confidence than
the underlying assumptions justify.”
Stainforth et al. make a statement that is equivalent to Betz’s modal statement of
possibility: “Each model run is of value as it presents a ‘what if’ scenario from which we
may learn about the model or the Earth system.” Insufficiently large initial condition
ensembles combined with model parameter and structural uncertainty preclude forming a
PDF from climate model simulations that has much meaning in terms of establishing a
mean value or confidence intervals. In the presence of scenario uncertainty, which
characterizes climate model simulations, attempts to produce a PDF for climate sensitivity
(e.g. Annan and Hargreaves 2009) are arguably misguided and misleading.
A comprehensive approach to uncertainty management and elucidation of the elements
of uncertainty is described by the NUSAP6 scheme, which includes methods to determine
the pedigree and quality of the relevant data and methods used (e.g. van der Sluijs et al.
2005a,b). The complexity of the NUSAP scheme arguably precludes its widespread
adoption by the IPCC. The challenge is to characterize uncertainty in a complete way while
retaining sufficient simplicity and flexibility for its widespread adoption. In the context of
risk analysis, Spiegelhalter and Riesch (2011) describe a scheme for characterizing
4 Guidance Notes for Lead Authors of the IPCC Fourth Assessment Report on Addressing Uncertainties,
http://www.ipccwg1.unibe.ch/publications/supportingmaterial/uncertainty-guidancenote.pdf
5 PDF: probability density function
6 http://www.nusap.net/
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uncertainty that covers the range from complete numerical formalization of probabilities to
indeterminancy and ignorance, and includes the possibility of unspecified but surprising
events. Quality of evidence is an important element of both the NUSAP scheme and the
scheme described by Spiegelhalter and Riesch (2011). The GRADE scale of Guyatt et al.
(2008) provides a simple yet useful method for judging quality of evidence, with a more
complex scheme for judging quality utilized by NUSAP.
4 Consensus and disagreement
The uncertainty associated with climate science and the range of decision making
frameworks and policy options provides much fodder for disagreement. Here I argue that
the IPCC’s consensus approach enforces overconfidence, marginalization of skeptical
arguments, and belief polarization. The role of cognitive biases (e.g. Tversky and
Kahneman 1974) has received some attention in the context of the climate change debate,
as summarized by Morgan et al. (2009). However, the broader issues of the epistemology
and psychology of consensus and disagreement have received little attention in the context
of the climate change problem.
Kelly (2005, 2008) provides some general insights into the sources of belief polarization
that are relevant to the climate change problem. Kelly (2008) argues that “a belief held at
earlier times can skew the total evidence that is available at later times, via characteristic
biasing mechanisms, in a direction that is favorable to itself.” Kelly (2008) also finds that
“All else being equal, individuals tend to be significantly better at detecting fallacies when
the fallacy occurs in an argument for a conclusion which they disbelieve, than when the
same fallacy occurs in an argument for a conclusion which they believe.” Kelly (2005)
provides insights into the consensus building process: “As more and more peers weigh in
on a given issue, the proportion of the total evidence which consists of higher order
psychological evidence [of what other people believe] increases, and the proportion of the
total evidence which consists of first order evidence decreases . . . At some point, when the
number of peers grows large enough, the higher order psychological evidence will swamp
the first order evidence into virtual insignificance.” Kelly (2005) concludes: “Over time,
this invisible hand process tends to bestow a certain competitive advantage to our prior
beliefs with respect to confirmation and disconfirmation. . . In deciding what level of
confidence is appropriate, we should taken into account the tendency of beliefs to serve as
agents in their own confirmation.”
So what are the implications of Kelly’s arguments for the IPCC? Cognitive biases in the
context of an institutionalized consensus building process have arguably resulted in the
consensus becoming increasingly confirmed in a self-reinforcing way. The consensus
process of the IPCC has marginalized dissenting skeptical voices, who are commonly
dismissed as “deniers” (e.g. Hasselman 2010). Experiences of several IPCC reviewers in
this regard have been publicly documented (e.g. McKitrick 2008; McKitrick,7 McIntyre,8
Christy9). This “invisible hand” that marginalizes skeptics is operating to the substantial
7 Ross McKittrick, “Fix the IPCC”, in the Financial Post, 8/27/10 http://opinion.financialpost.com/2010/08/
27/fix-the-ipcc-process/#ixzz0y0p4sz8u
8 Steve McIntyre, “Yamal and IPCC AR4 Review Comments,” http://climateaudit.org/2009/10/05/yamal-
and-ipcc-ar4-review-comments/
9 John R. Christy, Testimony to the House Science, Space and Technology Committee, “Examining the
Process Concerning Climate Change Assessments,” http://science.house.gov/sites/republicans.science.house.
gov/files/documents/hearings/ChristyJR_written_110331_all.pdf
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detriment of climate science, as well as biasing policies that are informed by climate
science. The importance of skepticism is aptly summarized by Kelly (2008): “all else being
equal, the more cognitive resources one devotes to the task of searching for alternative
explanations, the more likely one is hit upon such an explanation, if in fact there is an
alternative to be found.”
The intense disagreement between scientists that support the IPCC consensus and
skeptics becomes increasingly polarized as a result of the “invisible hand” described by
Kelly (2005, 2008). Disagreement itself can be evidence about the quality and sufficiency
of the evidence. Disagreement can arise from disputed interpretations as proponents are
biased by excessive reliance on a particular piece of evidence. Disagreement can result from
‘conflicting certainties,’ whereby competing hypotheses are each buttressed by different
lines of evidence, each of which is regarded as ‘certain’ by its proponents. Conflicting
certainties arise from differences in chosen assumptions, neglect of key uncertainties, and
the natural tendency to be overconfident about how well we know things (e.g. Morgan et al.
2009).
5 Reasoning about uncertainty
The IPCC objective is to assess existing knowledge about climate change. The IPCC
assessment process combines a compilation of evidence with subjective Bayesian
reasoning. This process is described by Oreskes (2007) as presenting a ‘consilience of
evidence’ argument, which consists of independent lines of evidence that are explained by
the same theoretical account. Oreskes draws an analogy for this approach with what
happens in a legal case.
The consilience of evidence argument is not convincing unless it includes parallel
evidence-based analyses for competing hypotheses. Any system that is more inclined to
admit one type of evidence or argument rather than another tends to accumulate variations
in the direction towards which the system is biased. In a Bayesian analysis with multiple
lines of evidence, you could conceivably come up with enough multiple lines of evidence
to produce a high confidence level for each of two opposing arguments, which is referred to
as the ambiguity of competing certainties. If you acknowledge a substantial level of
uncertainty and ignorance, the competing certainties disappear.
To be convincing, the arguments for climate change need to change from the one-sided
consilience of evidence model to parallel evidence-based analyses of competing hypotheses.
The rationale for parallel evidence-based analyses of competing hypotheses is eloquently
described by Kelly’s (2008) key epistemological fact:
“For a given body of evidence and a given hypothesis that purports to explain that
evidence, how confident one should be that the hypothesis is true on the basis of the
evidence depends on the space of alternative hypotheses of which one is aware. In
general, how strongly a given body of evidence confirms a hypothesis is not solely a
matter of the intrinsic character of the evidence and the hypothesis. Rather, it also
depends on the presence or absence of plausible competitors in the field. It is because
of this that the mere articulation of a plausible alternative hypothesis can dramatically
reduce how likely the original hypothesis is on one’s present evidence.”
Parallel evidence-based analyses of competing hypotheses provides an explicit and
important role for skeptics. Further, such an analysis provides a framework whereby
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scientists with a plurality of viewpoints participate in an assessment. Disagreement then
becomes the basis for focusing research in a certain area, and so moves the science forward. The
IPCC detection and attribution analysis is conducted using forced and unforced climate model
simulations, which seems consistent with this idea. However, the inferences drawn from these
simulations in the attribution assessment neglect to seriously consider natural variability (forced
and unforced) in a manner that accounts for uncertainty in natural forcing and a coherent signal
from multi-decadal internal oscillations (e.g. Curry and Webster 2011).
Reasoning about uncertainty in the context of evidence-based analyses is not at all
straightforward for the climate problem. Because of the complexity of the climate problem,
Van der Sluijs et al. (2005) argue that uncertainty methods such as subjective probability or
Bayesian updating alone are not suitable for this class of problems, because the
unquantifiable uncertainties and ignorance dominate the quantifiable uncertainties. Any
quantifiable Bayesian uncertainty analysis “can thus provide only a partial insight into what
is a complex mass of uncertainties” (Van der Sluijs et al. 2005).
Expert judgments about confidence levels are made by the IPCC on issues that are
dominated by unquantifiable uncertainties. Because of the complexity of the issues, individual
experts use different mental models and heuristics for evaluating the interconnected evidence.
Biases can abound when reasoning and making judgments about such a complex problem. Bias
can occur (e.g. Curry and Webster 2011) by excessive reliance on a particular piece of
evidence (e.g. CO2 forcing), the presence of cognitive biases in heuristics (e.g. anchoring of
climate sensitivity values to a narrow range or most likely value), failure to account for
indeterminacy and ignorance (endemic throughout the IPCC assessment process), and logical
fallacies and errors including circular reasoning (e.g. inverse calculations of aerosol optical
depth used to draw conclusions regarding attribution). Further, the consensus building process
itself can be a source of bias (Kelly 2005).
Identifying the most important uncertainties and introducing a more objective assessment of
confidence levels requires introducing a more disciplined logic into the climate change
assessment process. A useful approach would be the development of hierarchical logical
hypothesis models that provides a structure for assembling the evidence and arguments in
support of the main hypotheses or propositions. A logical hypothesis hierarchy (or tree) links
the root hypothesis to lower level evidence and hypotheses. While developing a logical
hypothesis tree is somewhat subjective and involves expert judgments, the evidential judgments
are made at a lower level in the logical hierarchy. Essential judgments and opinions relating to
the evidence and the arguments linking the evidence are thus made explicit, lending structure
and transparency to the assessment. To the extent that the logical hypothesis hierarchy
decomposes arguments and evidence to the most elementary propositions, the sources of
disputes are easily illuminated and potentially minimized.
Bayesian Network Analysis using weighted binary tree logic is one possible choice for such
an analysis. However, a weakness of Bayesian Networks is its two-valued logic and inability to
deal with ignorance, whereby evidence is either for or against the hypothesis. An influence
diagram is a generalization of a Bayesian Network that represents the relationships and
interactions between a series of propositions or evidence (Spiegelhalter 1986). Cui and
Blockley (1990) introduce interval probability three-valued logic into an influence diagram.
The three-valued logic has an explicit role for uncertainties (the so-called “Italian flag”) that
recognizes that evidence may be incomplete or inconsistent, of uncertain quality or meaning.
Combination of evidence proceeds generally as for a Bayesian combination, but are modified
by the factors of sufficiency, dependence and necessity.
Hall et al. (2005) apply influence diagrams and interval probability theory to a study
seeking the probability that the severe 2000 UK floods were attributable to climate change.
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Hall et al. used influence diagrams to represent the relevant evidential reasoning and
uncertainties. Three approaches to uncertainty in influence were compared, including
Bayesian belief networks and the interval probability methods Interval Probability Theory
and Support Logic Programming. Hall et al. argue that “interval probabilities represent
ambiguity and ignorance in a more satisfactory manner than the conventional Bayesian
alternative . . . and are attractive in being able to represent in a straightforward way
legitimate imprecision in our ability to estimate probabilities.”
Hall et al. conclude that influence diagrams can help to synthesize complex and contentious
arguments of relevance to climate change. Breaking down and formalizing expert reasoning can
facilitate dialogue between experts, policy makers, and other decision stakeholders. The
procedure used by Hall et al. supports transparency and clarifies uncertainties in disputes, in a
way that expert judgment about high level root hypotheses fails to do.
6 Conclusions
I have argued that the IPCC has oversimplified the issue of dealing with uncertainty in the
climate system, which can lead to misleading overconfidence. Consequently, the IPCC has
neither thoroughly portrayed the complexities of the problem nor the associated uncertainties in
our understanding. Improved understanding and characterization of uncertainty and ignorance
would promote a better overall understanding of the science and how to best target resources to
improve understanding. A concerted effort by the IPCC is needed to identify better ways of
framing the climate change problem, exploring and characterizing uncertainty, reasoning about
uncertainty in the context of evidence-based logical hierarchies, and eliminate bias from the
consensus building process itself. The IPCC should seek advice from the broader community of
scientists, engineers, statisticians, social scientists and philosophers in strategizing about ways
to improve its understanding and assessment of uncertainty.
Improved characterization of uncertainty and ignorance and a more realistic portrayal of
confidence levels could go a long way towards reducing the “noise” and animosity
portrayed in the media that fuels the public distrust of climate science that is clouding the
policy process. Once a better characterization of uncertainty is accomplished (including
indeterminacy and ignorance), then the challenge of communicating uncertainty is much
more tractable and ultimately more convincing.
Improved understanding and characterization of uncertainty is critical information for the
development of robust policy options. When working with policy makers and communicators,
it is essential not to fall into the trap of acceding to inappropriate demands for certainty; the
intrinsic limitations of the knowledge base need to be properly assessed and presented to
decision makers. Wynne (1992) makes an erudite statement: “the built-in ignorance of science
towards its own limiting commitments and assumptions is a problem only when external
commitments are built on it as if such intrinsic limitations did not exist.”
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